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Abstract
It is well known that the equilibrium solution of oligopoly games with isoe-
lastic demand functions can be indeterminate. I revisit this issue through
an open-loop diﬀerential game approach based on the assumption of sticky
prices, to show that indeterminacy arises only in steady state, in the limit
case where marginal costs tend to zero. Otherwise, at any time during the
game, Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle ensures the existence of a unique
and well defined solution, irrespective of the size of marginal costs. Finally,
I show that an analogous result holds in the feedback case, although the
Bellman equation of the representative firm cannot be solved analytically.
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1 Introduction
Most of the existing literature on oligopoly theory (either static or dynamic)
assumes linear demand functions, as this, in addition to simplifying calcula-
tions, also ensures both concavity and unicity of the equilibrium, which, in
general, wouldn’t be warranted in presence of convex demand systems (see
Friedman, 1977; and Dixit, 1986, inter alia).
In particular, a classic textbook example of a market with convex demand
is that where the demand function has a hyperbolic shape, this being a special
case of a more general class of models based on isoelastic demand curves.
As is well known, in such a case the maximum problem of a firm choosing
the output level is indeterminate if marginal cost is nil, since the revenue
generated by a hyperbolic (or, in general, isoelastic) demand is constant.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate a way out of the aforementioned
problem, oﬀered by dynamic game theory. To this purpose, I propose a
diﬀerential oligopoly game where firms face implicit menu costs of adjusting
outputs over time because market price is sticky (as in Simaan and Takayama,
1978; and Fershtman and Kamien, 1987, inter alia). The main results can
be summarised as follows. Using the open-loop solution method, I prove
that, for any given level of price stickiness, the first order condition on the
individual firm’s control yields a unique and well defined solution at any time
during the game, as long as the co-state variable associated with the price
dynamics diﬀers from zero (which is necessary for Pontryagin’s Maximum
Principle to hold). Then, I show that
• the steady state is stable for any degree of price stickiness, provided
that the number of firms in the market is at least equal to two;
• the monopoly equilibrium is stable, provided that the degree of price
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stickiness is below a critical threshols ensuring concavity; and
• indeterminacy arises at the steady state only, if the marginal production
cost tends to zero.
The feedback equilibrium cannot be characterised analytically, as the
game is not a linear quadratic one. However, the first order condition taken
on the Bellman equation of the generic firm shows that a unique solution
always exists at any time during the game, also in the limit case where
marginal cost is equal to zero.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises
the static game. The open-loop solution of the diﬀerential game with sticky
market price is investigated in section 3. The feedback problem is briefly
accounted for in section 4. Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 A summary of the static game
N firms supply individual quantities qi, i = 1, 2, 3, ...N. The good is homo-
geneous, and market demand is p = a/Q, Q =
PN
i=1 qi. Production entails a
total cost cq2i . Market competition takes place a` la Cournot-Nash; therefore,
firm i chooses qi so as to maximise profits πi = (p− cqi) qi. this entails that
the following first order condition must be satisfied:
∂πi
∂qi
=
a
P
j 6= qj³
qi +
P
j 6= qj
´2 − 2cqi = 0 (1)
and the associated second order condition:
∂2πi
∂q2i
= −
2a
P
j 6= qj³
qi +
P
j 6= qj
´3 − 2c ≤ 0 (2)
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which is always met. Imposing the symmetry condition qi = q for all qi =
1, 2, 3, ...N, one obtains the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
qCN =
1
N
r
a (N − 1)
2c
; pCN =
p
2ac (N − 1)
N − 1 (3)
yielding profits πCN = a (N + 1) / (2N2) . Note that one must exclude the
case N = 1 as the above solution is indeterminate under monopoly. As we
shall see in the remainder of the paper, this does not hold true in general,
if an appropriate dynamics is adopted. If the N firms were operating under
perfect competition, then p∗ = 2cqi and therefore q∗ =
p
a/ (2cN).
Moreover, it is apparent that the above solutions (i.e., both the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium and the perfectly competitive equilibrium) are determinate
for all c > 0, while they become indeterminate in correspondence of c = 0.
3 The dynamic setup
Consider the following dynamic version of the oligopoly game examined in
the previous section. At any t ∈ [0,∞) , each of N firms supplies quantity
qi (t) , i = 1, 2, 3, ...N, of the same homogeneous good, at an instantaneous
cost Ci (t) = cq2i (t) , where c ≥ 0 is a constant parameter measuring marginal
production cost. At any instant, the notional market demand function is:
bp (t) = a
Q (t)
, Q (t) =
NX
i=1
qi (t) ; a > c. (4)
However, the current market price p (t) is sticky and, as in Simaan and
Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987),1 its dynamics is de-
1See also Fershtman and Kamien (1990), Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Cellini and
Lambertini (2004).
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scribed by the following diﬀerential equation:
·
p (t) = s [bp (t)− p (t)] . (5)
The above dynamics establishes that price p (t) adjusts proportionately to
the diﬀerence between the correct price level given by the notional demand
function (4) and the current price, the instantaneous speed of adjustment
being measured by the constant parameter s ∈ [0,∞) .2 Firms face implicit
menu costs generated by the price stickiness, so that they never supply the
correct quantities leading to the market clearing price p (t) = bp (t) (except at
the steady state, of course).
The problem of firm i is to choose output qi (t) so as to maximisize its
own discounted profits:
Ji (p (t) ,q (t)) ,
Z ∞
0
[p (t)− cqi (t)] qi (t) e−ρtdt (6)
s.t. the price dynamics (5) and the initial condition p (0) = p0. q (t) is the
vector of all firms’ controls.
Given that the notional demand function is hyperbolic, the feedback so-
lution through the Bellman equation cannot be pursued as the problem at
hand is not in a linear-quadratic form. Therefore, I will confine my attention
to the open-loop solution. The Hamiltonian of firm i is:
Hi (p (t) ,q (t)) = e−ρt
(
[p (t)− cqi (t)] qi (t) + λi (t) s
"
a
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
− p (t)
#)
(7)
where λi (t) = µi (t) e
ρt, and µi (t) is the co-state variable that firm i asso-
ciates to p (t) .
2Note that, if s is infinitely high, then the price adjusts immediately to the notional
level, which is equivalent to saying that price is not sticky at all.
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The necessary conditions are:3
∂Hi (·)
∂qi (t)
= p (t)− 2cqi (t)−
λi (t) ash
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2 = 0 (8)
−∂Hi (·)
∂p (t)
=
·
λi (t)− ρλi (t)⇔
·
λi (t) = λi (t) (ρ+ s)− qi (t) (9)
with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλi (t) p (t) = 0. (10)
Now, solving (8) w.r.t. λi (t) , we obtain:
λi (t) =
[p (t)− 2cqi (t)]
h
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2
as
. (11)
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that (8) and/or (11) imply that p (t) 6=
2cqi (t) for all s ∈ (0,∞) . Or, conversely:
Lemma 1 Provided s ∈ (0,∞) and λi (t) > 0, the price will diﬀer from
marginal cost at any time t during the game.
Additionally, and more importantly, (8) and/or (11) also involve:4
Proposition 2 λi (t) > 0 implies that qi (t) , i = 1, 2, 3, ...N, is determined
by the instantaneous (negatively sloped) best reply function
q∗i (t) =
p (t)
h
3
√
ϕ− 4c
P
j 6= qj (t)
i
− p2 (t)−
h
3
√
ϕ+ 2c
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2
6c 3
√
ϕ
∈ R+
3Exponential discounting is omitted for brevity.
4The proof is omitted for brevity. However, note that equation (8) has three solutions
w.r.t. qi (i) , out of which only one - appearing in the text of Proposition 2 - is real and
positive.
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ϕ = 54ac2sλi (t)−
"
p (t) + 2c
X
j 6=
qj (t)
#3
+
6
vuuut3ac2sλi (t)
⎡
⎣27ac2sλi (t)−
Ã
p (t) + 2c
X
j 6=
qj (t)
!3⎤
⎦
at all t during the game, for all c ∈ [0, a) .
This result deserves to be spelled out in detail. The above Proposition
establishes that, unlike what happens in the corresponding static game, in the
present dynamic setup the optimal output of every single firm is determined
as long as the co-state variable λi (t) is not nil. Note that this fact, which is
shown in equation (11), is also ensured by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
Also note that Proposition 2 includes the degenerate case where marginal
cost c is equal to zero, in correspondence of which the solution of the static
game is indeterminate.
The second order (suﬃciency) condition for concavity requires:
∂2Hi (·)
∂q2i (t)
=
2λi (t) ash
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i3 − 2c ≤ 0 (12)
or, equivalently,
λi (t) ≤ λi (t) ,
c
h
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i3
2as
. (13)
We can proceed to the characterisation of the control dynamics. Diﬀer-
entiating (8) w.r.t. time, we have:
·
p (t)− 2c ·qi (t)−
·
λi (t) ash
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2 + 2λi (t) as
h ·
qi (t) +
P
j 6=
·
qj (t)
i
h
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i3 = 0,
(14)
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that can be solved to obtain the following description of the dynamics of firm
i’s control:5
·
qi =
Q3
·
p− a
µ ·
λiQ− 2λ
P
j 6=
·
qj
¶
s
2 (cQ3asλi)
. (15)
Imposing the symmetry conditions
·
qj =
·
qi =
·
q and qj = qi = q, and then
plugging (9) and (11) into (15), the dynamics of the optimal control can be
rewritten as follows:
·
q =
N2q [p (2s+ ρ)− 2cq (s+ ρ)]− as (N + 1)
2N2 (p− 3cq) . (16)
Under the same symmetry conditions, the dynamics of price simplifies as
follows:
·
p = s
∙
a
Nq
− p (t)
¸
. (17)
Imposing the stationarity condition
·
p = 0, one obtains p = a/ (Nq) , which
can be plugged into (16). At the steady state,
·
q = 0 yields:
qssA = 0; q
ss
B =
1
N
s
a [N (s+ ρ)− s]
2 (s+ ρ) c
> 0; qssC = −
1
N
s
a [N (s+ ρ)− s]
2 (s+ ρ) c
< 0.
(18)
The solutions qssA and q
ss
C can be disregarded for obvious reasons. In corre-
spondence of qss = qssB , the steady state price is:
pss = a
s
2 (s+ ρ) c
a [N (s+ ρ)− s] > 2cq
ss ∀ s ∈ (0,∞) . (19)
On the basis of (18-19), we have
Lemma 3 Provided c > 0, the steady state equilibrium (pss, qss) is econom-
ically acceptable for any N ≥ 1 and any finite value of s.
5Henceforth, the indication of time is omitted for brevity.
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This is a key result of the dynamic analysis carried out so far: unlike
the static model, where the equilibrium outcome (3) is acceptable only for
N ≥ 2, here the steady state of the dynamic setting is also well defined
for the monopoly case, under some approapriate conditions on the relevant
parameters.
At (pss, qss) , steady state profits amount to:
πss =
a [N (s+ ρ) + s]
2N2 (s+ ρ)
. (20)
The following result can be shown to hold:
Proposition 4 Take c > 0. The steady state identified by
pss = a
s
2 (s+ ρ) c
a [N (s+ ρ)− s] ; q
ss =
1
N
s
a [N (s+ ρ)− s]
2 (s+ ρ) c
is a saddle point for all N ≥ 3. If N ∈ {1, 2} , then:
• in N = 1, (pss, qss) is (i) a saddle point for all s ∈ (0, ρ/2) ; (ii) an
unstable focus for all s > ρ/2;
• in N = 2, (pss, qss) is (i) a saddle point for all s ∈ (0, 2ρ) ; (ii) a stable
node for all s ∈ (2ρ, 2.226ρ) ; a stable focus for all s > 2.226ρ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
What the above Proposition establishes is not only that the open-loop
solution of the dynamic game is determined (as opposed to the outcome of the
corresponding static game), but also that the associated steady state point
is always stable, provided that either (i) the number of firms is suﬃciently
high, or (ii) the speed of price adjustment is suﬃciently low. These features
deserve some additional comments. Property (i) indicates that competition
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(i.e., N ≥ 2) ensures stability irrespective of the level of price stickiness.
This is, per se, an element that cannot emerge from the corresponding static
game. Conversely, in the monopoly case the steady state (pss, qss) is unstable
for all levels of s above a critical threshold (and conversely). The reason for
this result is to be found through the analysis of suﬃciency condition (13).
In correspondence of (pss, qss) , the second order condition (13) revelas
that
λi (t) ≤ λi (t)⇔ N2 (s+ ρ)−Ns− 2s ≥ 0 (21)
holding for all
N ≥ bN = s±ps2 + 8s (s+ ρ)
2 (s+ ρ)
, (22)
with bN ≤ 2 over the whole parameter set. Therefore, N ≥ 2 suﬃces to
ensure concavity. As a consequence,
Proposition 5 (pss, qss) is surely a maximum point for all N ≥ 2.
If instead N = 1, then (13) is met for all s < ρ/2 (i.e., in the region where
(pss, qss) is a saddle point), while it is violated elsewhere (in the region where
(pss, qss) is an unstable focus). Accordingly, there emerges that instability
goes intuitively along with the lack of concavity at the monopoly equilibrium.
A simple comparative statics exercise can be carried out to assess the
eﬀect of an exogenous change in s on the equilibrium levels of price, individual
output and profits:
∂pss
∂s
=
Na2cρq
2cN2 (s+ ρ) [a (N (s+ ρ)− s)]3
> 0
∂qss
∂s
= − N
2acρ
2
q
2 [cN2 (s+ ρ)]3 a (N (s+ ρ)− s)
< 0 (23)
∂πss
∂s
=
aρ
2N2 (s+ ρ)2
> 0
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This implies:
Corollary 6 For all c > 0 and N ≥ 1, an increase in s entails a decrease
in the steady state output (per firm as well as at the industry level) and a
consequent increase in the steady state price. The balance of these two eﬀects
drives an increase in steady state profits.
Of course, this also drives a decrease in consumer surplus; therefore, one
can conclude that price stickiness is good for firms while being bad for con-
sumers (and, overall, for social welfare).
Then, taking the limit of (pss, qss) as s tends to infinity, it is easily ascer-
tained that:
lim
s→∞
pss = lim
ρ→0
pss =
p
2ac (N − 1)
N − 1 ; lims→∞ q
ss = lim
ρ→0
qss =
1
N
r
a (N − 1)
2c
(24)
and
lim
s→∞
πss =
a (N + 1)
2N2
. (25)
Additionally:
lim
s→0
pss = lim
ρ→∞
pss =
√
2acN
N
; lim
s→0
qss = lim
ρ→∞
qss =
r
a
2Nc
; (26)
lim
s→0
πss = lim
ρ→∞
πss =
a
2N
(27)
corresponding to the perfectly competitive outcome of the static game.
These results prove the following additional Corollary to Proposition 3,
describing the limit behaviour of the model, in correspondence of full price
adjustment:
Corollary 7 In the limit,
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• as s tends to infinity (or ρ tends to zero), the steady state (which is a
stable node) coincides with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which
is economically admissible for all N ≥ 2;
• as s tends to zero (or ρ tends to infinity), the steady state (which is un-
stable) coincides with the static perfectly competitive equilibrium, which
is admissible for all N ≥ 1.
This limit result is broadly in accordance with the corresponding result
obtained by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) in the model with linear demand
and decreasing returns to scale.
Finally, observe that qss becomes indeed indeterminate in the limit case
where c tends to zero, as it happens at the corresponding solution of the
static game. This means that the steady state of the static game precisely
portrays, in this special case, the outcome of the static setup. However, this
is true only as soon as firms reach the steady state, while it is not true (as
stated in Proposition 2) for an infinitely long time during the game.
4 The feedback problem
As stated above, the Bellman equation that would yield the feedback equi-
librium of the game cannot be solved analytically since the game at hand is
not a linear-quadratic one. However, a relevant implication of the first order
condition can be easily drawn.
The Bellman equation for firm i is:
ρVi (p (t)) = max
qi(t)
(
[p (t)− cqi (t)] qi (t) + V 0i (p (t)) s
"
a
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
− p (t)
#)
(28)
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where Vi (p) is the value function and V 0i (p) = ∂Vi (p (t)) /∂p (t) . Now, taking
the first order condition, we have:
p (t)− 2cqi (t)−
V 0i (p (t)) ash
qi (t) +
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2 = 0, (29)
which admits a unique real solution w.r.t. qi (t) , for any admissible value of
the marginal cost, including c = 0 :
q∗i (t) =
p (t)
h
3
√
' − 4c
P
j 6= qj (t)
i
− p2 (t)−
h
3
√
' + 2c
P
j 6= qj (t)
i2
6c 3
√
'
∈ R+
(30)
where the expression for ' corresponds to the expression for ϕ, except that
V 0i (p (t)) replaces λi (t) .
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5 Concluding remarks
I have revisited the Cournot oligopoly with isoelastic demand function using a
dynamic approach based upon the assumption of price stickiness. This setup
has allowed me to show that the indeterminacy issue commonly imputed to
the static version of the game does not arise in general in the present dynamic
reformulation, with the exception of the instant in which firms reach the
steady state. In the open-loop case, at any other time during the game, the
presence of co-state variables (which must diﬀer from zero on the basis of the
6To this regard, it is appropriate to stress that V 0i (p (t)) and λi (t) are not equivalent,
as shown by Caputo (2007): while λi (t) can be considered a shadow price when looking at
the open-loop solution, this is not true for V 0i (p (t)) , unless the game belongs to the class
of perfect or state-redundant games producing strongly time consistent open-loop Nash
equilibria. For a survey of perfect or state-redundant games, see Mehlmann (1988, ch. 4)
and Docker et al. (2000, ch. 4).
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Maximum Principle) in the first order conditions ensure the existence of a well
defined solution for firms’ optimal outputs. Likewise, an analogous conclusion
obtains in the feedback case, although the analytical solution remains of
course out of reach since the game is not defined in a linear-quadratic form.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4 Using (9) and (11), the control dynamics (15)
rewrites as follows:
·
qi =
as
³
2qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´
+
³
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´2
[p (2s+ ρ)− 2c (s+ ρ) qi]
2
³
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´h
N (p− 2cqi)− c
³
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
´i . (a1)
The above dynamics must be evaluated together with the state dynamics
·
p = s
Ã
a
qi +
P
j 6=i qj
− p
!
. (a2)
The stability properties of this dynamic system can be assessed by evaluating
the trace and determinant of the associated Jacobian matrix:
J =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∂
·
p
∂p
∂
·
p
∂qi
∂
·
qi
∂p
∂
·
qi
∂qi
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (a3)
At (pss, qss) , the trace and determinant of matrix J are:
T (J) =
(N2ρ− 2s) (s+ ρ) +Ns (2s− ρ)
N [N (s+ ρ)− 3s]
∆ (J) =
s (ρ+ s) [2s−N (N − 1) (ρ+ s)]
N [N (s+ ρ)− 3s]
(a7)
Now note that N ≥ 3 suﬃces to ensure that (i) the denominator of ∆ (J) is
positive, and (ii) the numerator of ∆ (J) is negative. Therefore, ∆ (J) < 0
for all N ≥ 3; as a result, the pair (pss, qss) identifies a saddle point.
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Otherwise, if N ∈ {1, 2} , one has to take into account the sign of T (J) ,
∆ (J) and [T (J)]2 − 4∆ (J) together:
• N = 1. In this case,
T (J) = ρ > 0, (a11)
∆ (J) =
2sρ (s+ ρ)
2s− ρ ≶ 0 ∀s ≶
ρ
2
, (a12)
[T (J)]2 − 4∆ (J) ≷ 0 ∀s ≶ ρ
2
. (a13)
Hence, in the monopoly case (pss, qss) is (i) a saddle point for all s <
ρ/2, (ii) an unstable focus for all s > ρ/2.
• N = 2. In this case,
T (J) =
s2 + 2ρ2
2s− ρ ≷ 0 ∀s ≶ 2ρ, (a8)
∆ (J) =
s (s+ ρ) (2s+ 3ρ)
s− 2ρ ≶ 0 ∀s ≶ 2ρ, (a9)
[T (J)]2 − 4∆ (J) ≷ 0 ∀s ≶ 2.226ρ. (a10)
Hence, in the duopoly case (pss, qss) is (i) a saddle point for all s < 2ρ,
(ii) a stable node for all s ∈ (2ρ, 2.226ρ) ; a stable focus for all s >
2.226ρ.
This concludes the proof.¥
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